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An Analysis of Early Warning Signals  An Analysis of Early Warning Signals 
of Currency Crises in Turkey, of Currency Crises in Turkey,
1986 1986- -2004 2004
Abstract: Within a signals approach framework àl aKaminsky, 
Lizondo and Reinhart, this paper aims both to detect the early 
warning signals of currency crises in Turkey and to discuss the 
reliability of an early warning system for this country. To determine 
major leading indicators of currency crises in Turkey, more than 45 
variables are tested, and by using the most relevant 15 variables, a 
composite index is constructed to estimate the probabilities of 
currency crises in the country.
JEL Classification: E31, F31, F47, C22
Key Words: Currency crises, signals approach, early warning system, real 
exchange rate misalignment, foreign trade, Turkish economy
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Introduction Introduction: :
Motivation Motivation and and Aims Aims
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Usage Usage of  of the the Concept Concept of  of “ “Crisis Crisis” ” in  in Economics Economics Literature Literature






























































































Krugman (1979) Krugman (1979)
 The concepts of “currency crisis” and “financial crisis” are 
relatively new in economics.
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Timing of Macroeconomic Crises in Turkey Timing of Macroeconomic Crises in Turkey








































































































































Source: Kibritçioğlu (2001): “Economic Crises and Governments...”
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Motivation Motivation
 Turkey liberalized international capital movements in 
1989.
 The country experienced then two severe currency 
crises, firstly in 1994 and secondly in early 2001.
 However, country-specific studies on the predictability 
of currency crises in Turkey are still far from being 
adequate.
 By employing the signals approach for the period of April 
1986 – April 2004, the current study is aimed both
to determine the major macroeconomic indicators, which 
send early warning signals prior to currency crises in 
Turkey, and
to discuss the reliability of an early warning system for 
Turkey. Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (13/79)
Macroeconomic  Macroeconomic 
Background: Background:
Turkey, 1978 Turkey, 1978- -2004 2004
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The 1980-1989 Transformation The 1980 The 1980- -1989 Transformation 1989 Transformation
1978  1978 - - 1980: 1980: Balance-of-payments crisis, 
productivity slowdown and accelerating inflation
January 1980: January 1980: Announcement of a substantial 
stabilization and structural adjustment program in 
order to gradually liberalize the economy
1980  1980 - - 1982: 1982: Domestic financial liberalization
May 1981: May 1981: Abandonment of the fixed exchange-rate 
regime
June 1984  June 1984 - - August 1989: August 1989: Capital account 
liberalization and convertibility of the Turkish lira 
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Post-1989 Macroeconomic Developments Post Post- -1989 Macroeconomic Developments 1989 Macroeconomic Developments
December 1993  December 1993 - - April 1994: April 1994: A major currency crisis 
and acceleration in the inflation
August 1999: August 1999: Negative macroeconomic impacts of 
the Marmara earthquake
December 1999: December 1999: Announcement of an exchange-
rate-based stabilization program for 2000-2002
November 2000 & February 2001: November 2000 & February 2001: Two successive 
banking and currency crises and political instability 
in Turkey
May 2001: May 2001: Announcement of the new economic 
program
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Governments & Political Instability Governments & Political Instability
in Turkey in Turkey, 1969 , 1969- -2004 2004
 1969-2004 = 36 years = 432 months
 Average period between two general elections = 48 months 
= 4 years
 Average life of governments = 15.4 months = 1.3 years
ICRG=International Country Risk Guide






































































































































































































































































Government Changes (28 times) ICRG's Political Risk Index for Turkey General Elections (9 times)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (17/79)
Volatility in Long Volatility in Long- -Run Growth (1950 Run Growth (1950- -2000) 2000)
 Turkey’s economic growth performance was highly volatile.



































































































































































































































Growth in Real GDP ($) Per Capita, %
Population Growth, %
Real GDP (TL) Growth, %
Real GDP ($) per Capita [right axis]
PWT6.1
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 In the late 1990s, Turkey was not able to join the global 




































































































































Global Inflation & Disinflation and Turkey Global Inflation & Disinflation and Turkey
(1949 (1949- -2003) 2003)















































































































































































































































































 Turkey suffered from high and persistent inflation since 
more than three decades. But, finally, it’s declining now...
Annual & Monthly Consumer Price Inflation in Turkey Annual & Monthly Consumer Price Inflation in Turkey
(1969 (1969- -2004, %) 2004, %)
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 Annual WPI and CPI increases fell below 15 percent as 
September 2004.
 Inflationary expectations in the country are also changing
in a positive direction.

















































































































































































































Selected Events WPI CPI
Recent Developments in Inflation (1998 Recent Developments in Inflation (1998- -2004) 2004)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (21/79)
Foreign Exchange Market Developments Foreign Exchange Market Developments
 In Turkey, the black-market for foreign exchange disappeared gradually 
since early 1980s.





















































































Black Market Exchange Rate (TL/USD)
























































































  Official Exchange Rate
 to “Black-Market”
Exchange Rate 
“Black-Market” Exchange Rate = 1.0






























































































































































245 BMER / OER (left axis) Annual Increases in OER (right axis)
 Since May 1981, Turkey has a relatively flexible exchange rate system. 
This gradually removed the “black-market” for FX in Turkey.
 In 2000, the monthly growth rates of nominal exchange rates were pre-
determined to gradually disinflate the economy.
“ “Black Black- -Market Market” ” Exchange Rates (BMER) vs. Official Exchange Rates (OER) Exchange Rates (BMER) vs. Official Exchange Rates (OER)
and Annual Increases in OER (1950 and Annual Increases in OER (1950- -2004) 2004)

























































































FX Deposits to M2
Currency Substitution in Turkey (1985 Currency Substitution in Turkey (1985- -2004) 2004)
 High inflation and low credibility of government policies in the 1990s 
created a strong currency substitution. But it’s changing now...
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (24/79)
 There is a tendency towards reverse currency substitution during
the AK-Party era.
 Government’s success in disinflating the economy and its 
increasing credibility may significantly be contributing to this
process.














































































































































































































Selected Events Foreign Exchange Deposits / TL-denominated Deposits (M2Y - M2) / M2
Two Indicators of Currency Substitution in Turkey (1998 Two Indicators of Currency Substitution in Turkey (1998- -2004, %) 2004, %)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (25/79)































































































































































Selected Events TL/USD Exchange Rate TL/Euro Exchange Rate
 During the last 27 months, nominal exchange rates do not show 
any tendency towards a sharp increase, as it has been observed 
in previous years.
Nominal Exchange Rates (TL/USD and TL/Euro) Nominal Exchange Rates (TL/USD and TL/Euro)
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 Note that annual growth rate of nominal USD exchange 
rates turned to negative values between May 2003 and 
April 2004.




















































































































































































































Selected Events TL/USD Exchange Rate TL/Euro Exchange Rate
Annual Changes in Nominal Exchange Rates (%) Annual Changes in Nominal Exchange Rates (%)
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 Following the 2000-2001 crisis, gross FX reserves of the 
Turkish Central Bank increased significantly.
 They are now about 38 percent higher than the level of 
reserves prior to the crisis.
















































































































































































































Central Bank Central Bank’ ’s Gross FX Reserves (billion USD) s Gross FX Reserves (billion USD)
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 The increasing deficit in net exports of goods is eliminated 
by an increasing surplus in net exports of services, and 
hence the CAB deficits are declining since March 2004.






























































































































































Selected Events Net Exports of Goods (billion TL)
Net Exports of Goods and Services (billion TL) Current Account Balance (billion TL)
Current Account Balance: Selected Items Current Account Balance: Selected Items
(billion USD, monthly) (billion USD, monthly)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (29/79)
 However, the cumulative BoP data shows that the recent 
improvements have not fully translated into the annual data yet.
 In 2003, the CAB/GDP ratio amounted to -2.8%. However, it will 
possibly climb to -4% in 2004. 

















































































































































































































Selected E vents Net Exports of Goods (billion TL)
Net Exports of Goods and Services (billion TL) Current Account Balance (billion TL)
Current Account Balance: Selected Items Current Account Balance: Selected Items
(billion USD, as of12 (billion USD, as of12- -monthly cumulative values) monthly cumulative values)



































































































































Erratic Nature of Net Short Erratic Nature of Net Short- -Term Capital Inflows  Term Capital Inflows 













2000 2000- -01 01
crisis crisis
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 One indication that Turkey’s policies are on the right track would 
be a return to positive short-term inflows at a steady and 
sustainable level. But a substantial increase in longer term capital 
inflows is not observed in Turkey.

























































































































































Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (32/79)
 Short-term capital outflows that rose following the 2000-2001 
financial crisis declined significantly after January 2002.
 Net short-term capital inflows (in terms of cumulative data) are 
positive in 2004.
















































































































































































































Selected Events Monthly 12-monthly
Net Short Net Short- -Term Capital Inflows (billion USD) Term Capital Inflows (billion USD)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (33/79)
 The volatility of the CAB to nominal industrial output is 
significantly lower than that of the net short-term capital inflows 
to output ratio.
Current Account Balance to Output & Net Short-Term Capital Inflows to Output































































































































































Selected Events Current Account Balance to Output Net Short-Term Capital Inflows to Output
Ratios of CAB & Net Short Ratios of CAB & Net Short- -Term Capital Inflows to Output Term Capital Inflows to Output
(January 1999 = 1.0 ; as of 12 (January 1999 = 1.0 ; as of 12- -monthly cumulative values) monthly cumulative values)
















































































































































































































High Fragility BSF3 BSF2
Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey
 Turkish banking sector experienced difficulties many times within the last 25 
years, as a result of their own excessive risk-taking behavior in the past.
(The BSF3 index is a weighted average of real annual changes in foreign liabilities,
claims on private sector, and total deposits. The BSF2 then covers only the first two of them.)
For Methodology: see Kibritçioğlu (2003), “Monitoring ...”.
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 The recent developments in the FL to FA ratio indicate that 
the external “open”, or “short”, position of the Turkish 
banking system is decreasing now...
Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey Banking Sector Fragility in Turkey
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Macroeconomic Background Macroeconomic Background
MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT MACROECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
(1978  (1978 – – 2001) 2001)
 Political instability
 Volatile economic growth
 High and persistent inflation
 Inflation-depreciation spiral
 Strong currency substitution
 Volatile short-term capital flows
 Large current account deficits
 Fragile banking sector
 Public sector deficits
 External shocks (oil prices, etc.)
 Moral hazard problems






 November 2000 –
February 2001Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (37/79)
Literature Review Literature Review




























“An economic crisis occurs, if the price and/or quantity in the market 
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Main Channels of the Main Channels of the
Currency Crises  Currency Crises (CCs)  (CCs) Literature Literature
Theoretical Models on Determinants of CC
(Three Generations of CC Models)
International Contagion Effects
Timing, Possibility and Predictability of CCs
Recent CCs and the so-called “New Financial 
Architecture” Debate
Domestic Macroeconomic Effects of CCs and 
their Sectoral Diffusion DynamicsKibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (41/79)
  Structural Models  Non-Structural Models  
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A Classification of Selected Empirical Studies
of Currency Crisis
A Classification of Selected Empirical Studies A Classification of Selected Empirical Studies
of Currency Crisis of Currency Crisis
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (42/79)
Explanatory Variables to Predict CCs
(according to theoretical & empirical models)
Explanatory Variables to Predict CCs Explanatory Variables to Predict CCs
(according to theoretical & empirical models) (according to theoretical & empirical models)
 government budget deficits to GDP
 excess real money balances
 real appreciation of the domestic currency
 terms-of-trade
 export and import growth
 current account deficits to GDP
 loss of international reserves of the central bank
 foreign debt to exports
 real interest rates
 output growth
 stock prices
 domestic credits to GDP
 broad money supply (M2) to reserves
 stock prices and banking crises
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (43/79)
Single-Country Studies for Turkey Single Single- -Country Studies for Turkey Country Studies for Turkey
Üç Üçer er et al. et al. (1998): (1998): signals approach.
The ratio of short-term foreign debt to GNP, the ratio of exports to imports, the 
ratio of short-term advances to Treasury over GNP, and the ratio of M2Y plus 
government domestic debt to GNP have strong predictive power for the 1994 crisis 
in Turkey, rather than the indicators which take place in the study of Kaminsky et 
al. (1998).
Kibrit Kibritç çio ioğ ğlu lu, B. (2000): , B. (2000): signals approach; Feb. 1986 – Sep. 1999.
The deviation of effective real exchange rate from its trend value, and as well as 
the exports to imports ratio, foreign trade balance to GDP ratio, current account 
balance to GDP ratio and the short-term capital movements to GDP ratio are among 
the major leading indicators of Turkish currency crises.
Murado Muradoğ ğlu lu &  & Feridun Feridun (2004): (2004): probit model; 1991-2000.
Consumer price index, Turkish Lira/US dollar exchange rate, and domestic credit 
are the significant variables in explaining financial crises. Results of the out-of-
sample tests indicate that the predictive power of the model is moderately high. 
Mariano  Mariano et al. et al. (2004): (2004): Markov switching financial vulnerability 
(Abiad, 2002); Feb. 1981 – Oct. 2002.
Their experiments with monthly and weekly models indicate that “real exchange 
rate, foreign exchange reserves and domestic credit/deposit ratio are the most 
important determinants of financial vulnerability”.
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (44/79)
Signals Approach Signals Approach
for Turkey: for Turkey:
Overview of the Methodology Overview of the MethodologyKibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (45/79)
Signals Approach Signals Approach
 Literature: Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) and 
Kaminsky et al. (1998)
 The signals approach is based on monitoring the 
evolution of indicators that tend to show “unusual”
behavior prior to currency crisis.
 When an indicator exceeds (or falls below) a pre-
determined threshold, then it is said to issue a “signal”
that a currency crisis may occur within a given period, 
such as in 12, 18 or 24 months.
 For this purpose, at first one should clearly define which 
periods should we call as crisis and what do we mean 
by saying unusual behavior of indicators.
 One should also be specific about how many periods 
should be considered saying that “prior to crisis.”
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (46/79)
Signals Approach Signals Approach
for Turkey: for Turkey:
Identification of Crises  Identification of Crises 
Episodes Episodes
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (47/79)


























where et = (Et –E t-1)/Et-1 and rt = - (Rt –R t-1)/Rt-1
E: nominal exchange rates (Turkish lira per US dollar)
R: gross foreign exchange reserves of the Turkish central bank (USD)
The foreign exchange market pressure (P) index is defined as an 
average of monthly percentage changes in nominal exchange rates 
and the negative of monthly percentage changes in gross foreign 
exchange reserves of the Turkish central bank.
According to the equation above, the P index, and hence the 
pressure in the foreign exchange market, increases with the 
depreciation of Turkish currency and/or the decline in foreign 
exchange reserves.
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (48/79)
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Identification of Crises Episodes  Identification of Crises Episodes (2) (2)
When the value of P exceeds this certain threshold value 
(TP), it means that the country has a currency crisis.
The threshold value, in this study, is determined as the 
mean of the index (µP) plus 1.5 standard deviations (σP):
TP = µP + 1.5 ×σ P
Then, a currency crisis (CC) can be observed when the P 
exceeds this threshold value:
CC = 1, if P > TP
CC = 0, otherwise
(Since the historic means are distorted in high-inflation periods, we define three sub-
samples according to whether annual change in consumer prices is below 40 %, 
between 40 % - 80 %, or higher than 80 % and construct P for each sub-sample.)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (49/79)
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Identification of Crises Episodes  Identification of Crises Episodes (4) (4)
There are five major crisis periods to be considered in this study: (1) July 1988, 
(2) January 1991 and March 1991, (3) February 1994 to April 1994, (4) December 
1995, and (5) February 2001 to April 2001 and June 2001.
In this study, we employ a 12-months window as signaling horizon, as it is also the 
case in many single-country studies in the literature. The gray-shaded areas above 
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Signals Approach Signals Approach
for Turkey: for Turkey:
Comparison of Individual  Comparison of Individual 
Performances of Potential  Performances of Potential 
Leading Indicators Leading Indicators
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (51/79)
Signals Approach:  Signals Approach: Classification of Signals Sent Classification of Signals Sent
by an Early Warning Indicator  by an Early Warning Indicator (1) (1)
 In the second stage of the signals approach, one should define both 
(i) the specific thresholds for the indicators that are expected to send 
signals before currency crises, and (ii) the length of the signaling horizon 
in which the indicators would be expected to send a signal. 
 A signal, which is followed by a crisis within 12 months, is called a good 
signal, while a signal not followed by a crisis within 12 months is called a 
false signal or “noise”.
 An individual indicator, on the other hand, is only accepted as sending a 
warning signal, when it goes beyond its own threshold value.
 Kaminsky et al. (1998) define an optimal threshold as the one that 
minimizes the noise to signal ratio (NSR), which is obtained by dividing 
false signals as a share of possible false signals, by good signals as a 
share of possible good signals. In fact, this approach requires a 
classification of signals into four groups, as seen in the following table. 
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (52/79)
Signals Approach:  Signals Approach: Classification of Signals Sent Classification of Signals Sent
by an Early Warning Indicator  by an Early Warning Indicator (2) (2)
An indicator is a perfect leading indicator, if it only has observations 
that belong either to cell A or to cell D.
Contrarily, an indicator, which has only observations of type B or C, 
would not be an early warning indicator of currency crises at all.












A  B  A+B 
No signal 
issued 
C  D  C+D 
Total 
Observations 
A+C  B+D  A+B+C+D 
 Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (53/79)
Practically, however, it is almost impossible to find an 
indicator, which sends solely good or bad signals. In terms of 
the four possible combinations defined in the table, there are 
various measures that are used in the literature to compare 





NSR = (B/(B+D)) / (A/(A+C))
By definition, the higher (lower) the first (last) two ratios are, 
the better is the performance of an indicator in preceding 
currency crises.
Signals Approach:  Signals Approach: Classification of Signals Sent Classification of Signals Sent
by an Early Warning Indicator  by an Early Warning Indicator (3) (3)












A  B  A+B 
No signal 
issued 
C  D  C+D 
Total 
Observations 
A+C  B+D  A+B+C+D 
 
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (54/79)
Signals Approach:  Signals Approach: Classification of Signals Sent Classification of Signals Sent
by an Early Warning Indicator  by an Early Warning Indicator (4) (4)
Another criterion to measure the performance of 
individual indicators is to compare the probability of 
crisis conditional on signal from an indicator with the 
unconditional probability of crises, which is the 
difference between P(crisis|signal) and P(crisis), namely 
A/(A+B) – [(A+C) /(A+B+C+D)].
To the extent that an indicator has useful information in 
predicting currency crises, the conditional probability 
would be higher than unconditional one. The indicator, 
on the other hand, whose conditional probability is 
higher than the unconditional probability, is also the one 
whose NSR values is less than unity.
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (55/79)
In the literature, many economists also consider the
average persistence of signals sent within the window 
period prior to crises. It is usually measured as “the 
number of good signals per crisis period”.
Finally, to evaluate the performances of indicators, one 
should also consider the average number of months prior 
to crisis the first good signal occurs because an indicator 
with lower NSR can only be a useful predictor of currency 
crises, if it typically sends warning signals as earlier as 
possible, to give governments sufficient time to take the 
necessary measures to attempt to prevent approaching 
crises. 
Signals Approach:  Signals Approach: Classification of Signals Sent Classification of Signals Sent
by an Early Warning Indicator  by an Early Warning Indicator (5) (5)
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (56/79)
By using monthly data for April 1986 – April 2004 (217 
observations), 46 variables are examined to find out which of 
them were the best indicators of currency crises in Turkey in the 
past.
Depending on the theoretical expectation about the sign of the 
relationship between an individual indicator and the P index, 
some variables send signals when they fall below their specified
threshold, while others are assumed as sending signals when 
they exceed their own threshold. Notice that the cut-off value for 
an indicator is measured in percentile of the observations.
In this study, to determine the variable-specific optimal 
threshold values, we employed one of the two grids of reference 
percentiles between 75 percent and 90 percent or 10 percent and 
25 percent, depending on the direction of the expected change of 
P following a signal sent by the individual indicator.
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The following table provides the comparative 
information about the performance of these 
selected individual indicators.
In this table, the potential early warning 
indicators of currency crises are ranked 
according to their NSR’s.
The results show that, in general, foreign-trade
and exchange-rate related indicators give the 
best results in sending early warning signals 
prior to currency crises.
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Results for Individual Indicators  Results for Individual Indicators (2) (2)
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P(crisis| signal) – 
P(crisis ) = [A/(A+B)] – 
[(A+C)/(A+B+C+D)]
Number of Months 
Prior to Crisis the 
First Good Signal 
Occurs
S1 Exports to Imports Ratio (-) 0.10 30.65 1.39 0.05 90.48 60.38 8.6
S2 Turkish Exporters' New Order Expectations (Up - Down) (-) 0.10 22.81 3.10 0.14 76.47 45.83 4.2
S3 Deviation of Reuters' Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend (-) 0.10 25.81 4.17 0.16 72.73 42.63 4.0
S4 Deviation of SPO's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend (-) 0.17 40.32 7.64 0.19 69.44 39.35 6.8
S5 Deviation of JPM's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend (-) 0.20 46.77 9.72 0.21 67.44 37.34 8.4
S6 Real Interest Rate Differential (id-if) (-) 0.17 37.10 9.03 0.24 63.89 33.79 5.6
S7 Trade Balance to Output Ratio (-) 0.10 20.97 5.56 0.26 61.90 31.81 5.0
S8 Annual Increase in Crude-Oil Prices (+) 0.90 20.97 6.25 0.30 59.09 28.99 5.6
S9 US 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates (+) 0.75 48.39 14.58 0.30 58.82 28.73 8.4
S10 Nominal Interest Rate Differential (id-if) (-) 0.14 29.03 9.03 0.31 58.06 27.97 7.2
S11 (Trade Balance + Short-Term Capital Inflow) / Output (-) 0.11 17.74 5.56 0.31 57.89 27.80 4.4
S12 Monthly Increase in ISE 100 Index  (-) 0.11 16.13 5.56 0.34 55.56 25.46 3.8
S13 Monthly Growth in Central Bank's Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves (-) 0.10 11.29 4.17 0.37 53.85 23.75 3.2
S14 CAB to Output Ratio (-) 0.15 25.81 10.42 0.40 51.61 21.52 6.0
S15 Average Compound Auction Rates of the Treasury (-) 0.22 38.71 16.67 0.43 50.00 19.90 7.2
S16 Crude-Oil Prices in USD/br (+) 0.89 19.35 8.33 0.43 50.00 19.90 3.2
S17 Deposit Money Banks' Net Foreign Liabilities to Total Deposits (+) 0.90 14.52 6.94 0.48 47.37 17.27 2.0
S18 Quarterly Change in Banking Sector Fragility Index (-) 0.25 40.32 19.44 0.48 47.17 17.07 8.2
S19 Monthly Growth in Imports (+) 0.86 20.97 11.11 0.53 44.83 14.73 10.8
S20 Short-Term Capital Inflows to Output (+) 0.78 33.87 18.75 0.55 43.75 13.65 10.4
S21 Monthly Growth of Consolidated Budget Balance / Output (-) 0.11 16.13 9.03 0.56 43.48 13.38 6.4
S22 Monthly Increase in Wholesale Price Index (+) 0.88 14.52 8.33 0.57 42.86 12.76 4.4
S23 Monthly Increase in Consumer Price Index (+) 0.90 12.90 8.33 0.65 40.00 9.90 5.4
S24 Monthly Change in M2 Multiplier (+) 0.90 12.90 8.33 0.65 40.00 9.90 5.0
S25 Deposit Money Banks' Foreign Liabilities to For. Assets (+) 0.88 14.52 9.72 0.67 39.13 9.03 2.0
S26 Deviation of Reuters' Real Exchange Rate Index from its Base-Year Value (-) 0.25 32.26 22.22 0.69 38.46 8.36 5.4
S27 Ratio of Deposit Money Banks' Domestic Credits to Total Assets (+) 0.74 33.87 23.61 0.70 38.18 0.00 5.8
S28 Monthly Growth in Exports (-) 0.10 12.90 9.03 0.70 38.10 8.00 7.4
S29 M2 to CB's Gross FX Reserves (+) 0.85 19.35 13.89 0.72 37.50 7.40 2.4
S30 Monthly Change in ICRG's Political Risk Index for Turkey (-) 0.15 17.74 13.08 0.74 39.29 6.99 7.4
S31 Monthly Growth in Central Bank's Domestic Assets (+) 0.76 25.81 19.44 0.75 36.36 6.27 9.4
S32 WPI to CPI Ratio (+) 0.90 12.90 9.72 0.75 36.36 6.27 2.4
S33 Monthly Change in Foreign Exchange Deposits to M2 Ratio (-) 0.75 24.19 22.22 0.92 31.91 1.82 7.6
S34 Monthly Growth in Deposit Money Banks' Real Total Domestic Credits (+) 0.75 25.81 24.31 0.94 31.37 1.28 9.8
S35 Deposit Money Banks' Domestic Credits to Output (+) 0.81 19.35 18.75 0.97 30.77 0.67 2.4
S36 Consolidated Budget Balance to Output (-) 0.21 20.97 20.83 0.99 30.23 0.14 8.8
S37 Imports to Output Ratio (-) 0.17 16.13 17.36 1.08 28.57 -1.53 3.6
S38 Monthly Growth in M1 (+) 0.77 19.35 22.92 1.18 26.67 -3.43 7.8
S39 Real Monthly Growth of Banking Sector Credits to Private Sector (+) 0.76 19.35 25.00 1.29 25.00 -5.10 9.2
S40 Timing of Government Changes (+) 0.00 4.84 6.25 1.29 25.00 -5.10 3.4
S41 Timing of General Elections (+) 0.00 1.61 2.08 1.29 25.00 -5.10 1.6
S42 Real Monthly Growth in Deposit Money Banks' Net Past Due Loans (+) 0.79 14.52 21.53 1.48 22.50 -7.60 8.2
S43 Monthly Growth in M2 (+) 0.89 6.45 9.72 1.51 22.22 -7.87 3.4
S44 Terms of Trade (-) 0.24 16.13 25.69 1.59 21.28 -8.82 4.6
S45 Annual Growth in Manufacturing Production Index (+) 0.23 12.90 24.31 1.88 18.60 -11.49 5.2
S46 Annual Growth in Ratio of M2 to Central Bank's Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves (+) 0.80 4.84 22.92 4.74 8.33 -21.76 2.0
Conditional Probability (weighted index) (+) 0.50 83.87 22.22 0.26 61.90 31.81 11.4
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S1 Exports to Imports Ratio
S2 Turkish Exporters' New Order Expectations (Up - Down)
S3 Deviation of Reuters' Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend
S4 Deviation of SPO's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend
S5 Deviation of JPM's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend
S6 Real Interest Rate Differential (id-if)
S7 Trade Balance to Output Ratio
S8 Annual Increase in Crude-Oil Prices
S9 US 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates
S10 Nominal Interest Rate Differential (id-if)
S11 (Trade Balance + Short-Term Capital Inflow) / Output
S12 Monthly Increase in ISE 100 Index 
S13 Monthly Growth in Central Bank's Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves
S14 CAB to Output Ratio
S15 Average Compound Auction Rates of the Treasury
S16 Crude-Oil Prices in USD/br
S17 Deposit Money Banks' Net Foreign Liabilities to Total Deposits
S18 Quarterly Change in Banking Sector Fragility Index
S19 Monthly Growth in Imports
S20 Short-Term Capital Inflows to Output
S21 Monthly Growth of Consolidated Budget Balance / Output
S22 Monthly Increase in Wholesale Price Index
S23 Monthly Increase in Consumer Price Index
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Results for Individual Indicators  Results for Individual Indicators (4) (4)
NSR<0.5 NSR<0.5
NSR>0.5 NSR>0.5
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S24 Monthly Change in M2 Multiplier
S25 Deposit Money Banks' Foreign Liabilities to For. Assets
S26 Deviation of Reuters' Real Exchange Rate Index from its Base-Year Value
S27 Ratio of Deposit Money Banks' Domestic Credits to Total Assets
S28 Monthly Growth in Exports
S29 M2 to CB's Gross FX Reserves
S30 Monthly Change in ICRG's Political Risk Index for Turkey
S31 Monthly Growth in Central Bank's Domestic Assets
S32 WPI to CPI Ratio
S33 Monthly Change in Foreign Exchange Deposits to M2 Ratio
S34 Monthly Growth in Deposit Money Banks' Real Total Domestic Credits
S35 Deposit Money Banks' Domestic Credits to Output
S36 Consolidated Budget Balance to Output
S37 Imports to Output Ratio
S38 Monthly Growth in M1
S39 Real Monthly Growth of Banking Sector Credits to Private Sector
S40 Timing of Government Changes
S41 Timing of General Elections
S42 Real Monthly Growth in Deposit Money Banks' Net Past Due Loans
S43 Monthly Growth in M2
S44 Terms of Trade
S45 Annual Growth in Manufacturing Production Index
S46 Annual Growth in Ratio of M2 to Central Bank's Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Results for Individual Indicators  Results for Individual Indicators (5) (5)
Political variables do not perform very well. Political variables do not perform very well.
NSR<1 NSR<1
NSR>1 NSR>1Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (61/79)
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:








Months Prior to 







S1 Exports to Imports Ratio 0.10 0.05 8.6 3.8
S2 Turkish Exporters' New Order Expectations (Up - Down) 0.10 0.14 4.2 2.4
S3 Deviation of Reuters' Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend 0.10 0.16 4.0 3.2
S4 Deviation of SPO's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend 0.17 0.19 6.8 5.0
S5 Deviation of JPM's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend 0.20 0.21 8.4 5.6
S6 Real Interest Rate Differential (id-if) 0.17 0.24 5.6 4.6
S7 Trade Balance to Output Ratio 0.10 0.26 5.0 2.6
S8 Annual Increase in Crude-Oil Prices 0.90 0.30 5.6 2.6
S9 US 3-Month Treasury Bill Rates 0.75 0.30 8.4 5.8
S10 Nominal Interest Rate Differential (id-if) 0.14 0.31 7.2 3.6
S11 (Trade Balance + Short-Term Capital Inflow) / Output 0.11 0.31 4.4 2.0
S12 Monthly Increase in ISE 100 Index  0.11 0.34 3.8 2.0
S13 Monthly Growth in Central Bank's Gross Foreign Exchange Reserves 0.10 0.37 3.2 1.2
S14 CAB to Output Ratio 0.15 0.40 6.0 3.2
S15 Average Compound Auction Rates of the Treasury 0.22 0.43 7.2 4.8
S16 Crude-Oil Prices in USD/br 0.89 0.43 3.2 2.4
S17 Deposit Money Banks' Net Foreign Liabilities to Total Deposits 0.90 0.48 2.0 1.8
S18 Quarterly Change in Banking Sector Fragility Index 0.25 0.48 8.2 4.8
S19 Monthly Growth in Imports 0.86 0.53 10.8 2.4
S20 Short-Term Capital Inflows to Output 0.78 0.55 10.4 4.2
S21 Monthly Growth of Consolidated Budget Balance / Output 0.11 0.56 6.4 2.0
S22 Monthly Increase in Wholesale Price Index 0.88 0.57 4.4 1.6
S23 Monthly Increase in Consumer Price Index 0.90 0.65 5.4 1.6
S24 Monthly Change in M2 Multiplier 0.90 0.65 5.0 1.2
S25 Deposit Money Banks' Foreign Liabilities to For. Assets 0.88 0.67 2.0 1.8
Potential Early Warning Indicators of Currency Crises
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The results show that, in general, foreign-trade and
exchange-rate related indicators give the best results
in sending early warning signals prior to currency crises:
 a falling ratio of export-revenues to import-payments 
below 56 percent (S1),
 a sharp worsening  in order-expectations of Turkish 
exporters (S2),
 a significant (more than 6.8%) real appreciation of the 
Turkish lira against foreign currencies (S3, S4 and S5), 
and
 a real interest rate differential more than –5.1 percent 
(S6)
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Results for Individual Indicators  Results for Individual Indicators (7) (7)
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Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
FX Market Pressure Index and CCs FX Market Pressure Index and CCs
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Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Best Three Individual Performers  Best Three Individual Performers (1) (1)Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (65/79)
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Best Three Individual Performers  Best Three Individual Performers (2) (2)
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S2 that represents the order expectations of Turkish 
exporters is defined as the difference between the 
share of exporters who expect an increase in foreign 
orders for coming months and that of the exporters 
who expect a fall.
It is calculated from the Turkish Central Bank’s survey 
data on the amount of new orders received from the 
exports market (trend of the next 3 months, excluding 
seasonal variations).
The 10-percentile threshold for S2 corresponds a 
difference of –6.2, which means that the order falls 
exceeds the order increases.
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Best Three Individual Performers  Best Three Individual Performers (2) (2)
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Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Best Three Individual Performers  Best Three Individual Performers (3) (3)
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Signals Approach Signals Approach
for Turkey: for Turkey:
Composite Leading Indicators  Composite Leading Indicators 
and Estimation of Crisis  and Estimation of Crisis 
Probabilities ProbabilitiesKibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (69/79)
We construct a weighted composite leading indicator (C) by 
using 15 of the best performing leading indicators, which are:
S1 Exports to Imports Ratio
S2 Turkish Exporters' New Order Expectations (Up - Down)
S5 Deviation of JPM's Real Exchange Rate Index from its Trend
S6 Real Interest Rate Differential (id-if)
S7 Trade Balance to Output Ratio
S8 Annual Increase in Crude-Oil Prices
S12 Monthly Increase in ISE 100 Index 
S13 Monthly Growth in Central Bank's Gross FX Reserves
S18 Quarterly Change in Banking Sector Fragility Index
S20 Short-Term Capital Inflows to Output
S21 Monthly Growth of Consolidated Budget Balance / Output
S22 Monthly Increase in Wholesale Price Index
S23 Monthly Increase in Consumer Price Index
S24 Monthly Change in M2 Multiplier
S33 Monthly Change in Foreign Exchange Deposits to M2 Ratio
Note: For weighting of Ss, the inverses of NSRs of individual indicators are used.
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Construction of a Composite Leading Indicator Construction of a Composite Leading Indicator
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Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
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Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Composite Leading Indicator and CCs in Turkey Composite Leading Indicator and CCs in Turkey

























Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (72/79)
Signals Approach: Signals Approach:
Probabilities of Currency Crisis Estimated Probabilities of Currency Crisis Estimated

























































































































































































































































































To evaluate the overall performance of the model we used several statistical tests,
such as quadratic probability score test, LPS, GBS, and unconditional probability indicators.Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (73/79)
 As it is almost always the case in economics, there are 
no easy solutions for difficult problems.
 For the predictability of currency crises (CCs), this 
implies that it is almost impossible to explain and 
predict these events without considering the role of 
history and non-economic factors, such as cultural 
factors.
 For governments, however, it is highly crucial to have 
an early warning mechanism that can be used for 
informative purposes, although building a reliable 
early warning system to detect possible CCs is a very 
challenging task.
Concluding Remarks (1) Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks (1) (1)
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (74/79)
 This study attempted to construct an EWS àl aKaminsky,
Lizondo and Reinhart. It has a pioneering nature within the 
existing literature on Turkey, because it is probably the 
first, Turkey-specific, single country study which has a very 
broad sample period and a long list of potential leading 
indicators of CCs for Turkey.
 The EWS built here show that, in general, foreign-trade and 
exchange-rate related indicators produce the best results 
in sending early warning signals prior to currency crises.
 For Turkey, we need further empirical investigation to 
compare the results of the signals approach employed here 
with that of the achieved/achievable within the
logit/probit framework and/or newly developed Markov-
switching techniques.
Concluding Remarks (2) Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks (2) (2)
Kibritçioğlu, November 8, 2004, (75/79)
Appendix Appendix: :
Banking Sector Fragility Banking Sector Fragility
Kibritçioğlu, A. (2003): “Monitoring Banking Sector Fragility”.
Arab Bank Review (Jordan), 5(2): 51-66.
PDF: http://econwpa.wustl.edu:8089/eps/mac/papers/0312/0312011.pdf
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Bank Runs
Credit Booms => 
increase in NPLs









Possible Events Possible Events
Major Types Major Types
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Banking Sector  Banking Sector 
Fragility Index and  Fragility Index and 
the Five Stages of  the Five Stages of 
Fragility Fragility
Kibritcioglu (2003):
“The BSF3 index is a 
weighted average of real 
annual changes in foreign 
liabilities, claims on private 
sector, and total deposits.”
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Changes in the BSF Index and the Five Phases Changes in the BSF Index and the Five Phases
of a Hypothetical Banking Crisis of a Hypothetical Banking Crisis
  Banks’ 
Behaviour 
Direction of the 















(optimistic, or boom, 
phase) 
the probability starts 










furthermore    (probably 
panic arises) 
Phase 
3  risk avoiding  falls below zero 






borderline to crisis 
Phase 
4  risk avoiding  falls below –0.5 
continues to 
increase     (high 
fragility) 
most probably, a 





start to take 
risk again 
increases 
towards zero ** 
falls again       
(recovery period) 
crisis is over if the 
BSF is very close or 
equal to zero again 
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Different Results about Timing of  Different Results about Timing of 





Peak of the 





Episode of High Fragility 
(if applicable)
 July 1979   May 1980   Jan. 1979 - Nov. 1980 
1982-1985 1982 1982 1982-1985 1982  Sep. 1982   Nov. 1983  medium fragility
 Mar. 1987   Sep. 1988   Apr. 1988 - Oct. 1989 
1991 1991  Jan. 1991   Mar. 1991  1991  Dec. 1990   Nov. 1991   Nov. 1991 - Mar. 1992 
1994* 1994** 1994-1995 1994-1995  Nov. 1993   Oct. 1994   Apr. 1994 - Apr. 1995 
 Sep. 1997   July 1999   Mar. 1999 - Mar. 2000 
2000-present  Nov. 2000   Feb. 2002   June 2001 - Dec. 2002
Current Study (the BSF2, or BSF2*, index)
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